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A Study on the Benefit of Corporate Accounting Information in accordance with the Company's conservatism (from a management accounting consulting perspective)

Lee Soon Mi, *Doctoral Student, Dept. Of Knowledge Service & Consulting, Hansung University, Seoul, Korea, okdltnsal@naver.com*
Yen-yooYou, *Professor, Dept. Of Knowledge Service & Consulting, Hansung University, Seoul, Korea, threey0818@hansung.ac.kr*
*Corresponding Author

Abstract. This paper aims to judge the impact of accounting information on corporate profits based on conservatism. As a verification sample, 543 companies listed on securities (excluding KOSDAQ and financial industry) among the Bank of Korea (2018) ``2017 Business Management Analysis'' and the Korea Productivity Center's corporate analysis were sampled (December). Regression analysis was performed after analysis of search factors using SPSS22. Corporate accounting information. activity. Stable growth is positive as a financial analysis index that has a positive (+) effect on profitability, corporate remuneration is profitable as an appropriate effect, and profitability is a positive (+) effect, profitability, activity and stability, prior research and research expenses. And savings will be reflected immediately. but will be affected in the worst case. The explanation of corporate accounting information is a financial performance that proves that corporate remuneration prepares for future uncertainty and provides profit benefits. In the future, it is necessary to discuss corporate compensation such as high value-added productivity as an additional variable of corporate accounting information.

Keywords: Corporate Accounting Information, Corporate conservatism, International Accounting St andards (IFRS), Profitability, Stability, Activity, Growth ability, Profitability Benefits

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INTRODUCTION

In recent prior research, the way companies evaluate companies and investors is mostly in two forms. One is a research on over-confidence bias[1] that is biased toward information asymmetry[2] and profit management, and the other is a study on transparency of accounting information [3] in dealing with costs and losses.
In this study, we analyzed whether the stronger the enterprise's conservatism, the more information asymmetry [4], is reflected in a way of profit growth that reflects the view that the better the quality of accounting information will be [8], and whether it is reflected in the manipulation of profits by institutional investors as part of accounting conservatism[9, 10]. In addition, to reflect the characteristics of accounting remuneration and the Board of Directors, an entity's conservatism was used as a control variable to analyze its benefits [13, 14, 15].

Theory and formula

2-1-1 Corporate Accounting Information

Unlike previous financial statements, an entity's accounting information assesses its profitability, stability, activity and growth in accounting. This assessment can also reduce the uncertainty of financial robustness and quality of accounting information coming from the asymmetry of information between special stakeholders and the benefit of business and investors in companies that introduce international accounting standards [2, 3].

2-1-2 Corporate conservatism

Corporate conservatism improves the quality of an entity's accounting information by preventing managers' opportunism and protecting special stakeholders and investors through the firm's financial robustness, evaluates losses and costs as quickly as possible, and slowly assesses profits and profits to reduce the entity's accounting information transparency and agent costs. In this study, prior research is used to analyze how enterprise conservatism is used as a control variable and is affected by benefit benefits [1, 4].

2-1-3 Benefit Benefits

The excessive retention of in-house reserves by many companies has recently been raised as a social problem. These problems are causing problems such as having to allocate appropriately to shareholders' demand returns as corporate profits increase, and the more conflicts between shareholders and creditors increase, the higher the tendency of corporate conservatism, causing other people's capital to fall. In this study, we would like to analyze why financial robustness is necessary for efficient benefit [15].

2-2-1 Research Method

In the enterprise's accounting information, profitability shall be the ratio of operating capital operating profit, capital operating profit ratio, equity operating profit ratio, sales operating profit ratio, and activity shall be the ratio of operating capital turnover, fixed asset turnover rate and total capital investment rate. Stability is fixed ratio, fixed long-term suitability rate, debt ratio, growth rate shall be total capital increase rate, tangible fixed asset growth rate and equity capital increase rate, and the company's conservatism, which is the adjustment variable, is labor cost ratio, sales cost and general management cost, value added rate. We would like to study how corporate accounting information affects benefit as a result of the remuneration of the entity, with the dependent variable benefit being dividend propensity, dividend rate and equity dividend rate.

2-2-2 Measurement Method

With corporate conservatism as an adjustment variable, how the accounting information of the entity affects its benefit is analyzed in spss22 from a management accounting consulting perspective through an exploratory factor analysis and regression analysis.

1. Experimental setup

3.1 Research Model



Figure1.ResearchModel

[Table 1] Descriptive Statistics

	N-o	Minimum-0	Maximum-0	Mean-0	Std Deviation-0	Skewness-0		Kurtosis-0	
	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Std-Error	Statistic	Sd-Error

Pro1	543	-3.912	5.734	1.23923	1.193994	-.314	.105	.674	.209
Pro2	543	-4.605	3.863	.95969	1.086755	-.617	.105	1.377	.209
Pro3	543	-3.507	4.476	1.42482	1.217964	-.393	.105	-.208	.209
Pro4	543	-3.912	4.401	1.13987	1.206010	-.206	.105	.864	.209
Aro1	543	-4.605	1.267	-.31792	.781031	-1.927	.105	6.631	.209
Aro2	543	-3.507	1.890	.03098	.623925	-.983	.105	3.251	.209
Aro3	543	-4.605	3.547	.28795	.960450	-1.278	.105	4.636	.209
Aro4	543	-3.507	5.292	2.53733	.867988	-1.481	.105	6.038	.209
Sro1	543	.445	7.088	4.57780	.549605	-.746	.105	6.585	.209
Sro2	542	-4.605	2.570	.09196	1.229287	-1.934	.105	4.490	.209
Sro3	543	-2.813	11.327	4.09296	1.105357	-.436	.105	6.350	.209
Gro1	543	-3.22	5.34	.9832	1.28909	.611	.105	.118	.209
Gro2	542	-3.22	7.37	.8034	1.48636	1.211	.105	1.745	.209
Gro3	543	-4.61	5.30	1.1024	1.36223	.243	.105	.432	.209
Cro1	543	-.462	4.356	2.31770	.738746	-.530	.105	1.361	.209
Cro2	543	-.073	4.770	2.41951	.889732	.158	.105	-.213	.209
Cro3	543	-1.897	4.580	2.84093	.814926	-1.326	.105	4.354	.209
Pbo1	543	-1.05	7.92	2.0750	1.80101	.082	.105	-1.169	.209
Pbo2	543	-3.51	10.67	2.1494	1.77956	.302	.105	.066	.209
Pbo3	543	-4.61	3.10	.2104	.75836	-.474	.105	4.524	.209
Valid N (listwise)	541								

Results from [Table 1] West, Finch and Curran (1995) (|wattness|attachment|8)8) and confirmed that the study model is not unreasonable.

[Table 2]Rotated Component Matrix [a]

	Component						
	1-1	**2-1**	**3-1**	**4-1**	**5-1**	**6-1**	Cronbach
Pro1	.921						
Pro2	.909						
Pro4	.905						.967
Pro3	.892						
Aro1		.955					
Aro3		.913					
Aro2		.800					.876
Aro4		.674					
Cro1			.859				
Cro3			.770				.723

Cro2			.619				
Pbo2				.818			
Pbo1				.796			.735
Pbo3				.684			
Sro1					.882		
Sro3					.791		.656
Sro2					.683		
Gro1						.781	
Gro2						.680	.599
Gro3						.674	
Eigen-value	4.028	3.414	2.253	2.216	2.062	1.733	
Variance(%)	20.14	17.071	11.266	10.63	10.31	8.666	
KMO=.673 Bartlett's =12238.626. p.000							

Exploratory factor analysis for validity verification and berrymax rotation method analysis result for reliability verification KMO=. 684, Bartlett's =12773.4 df=190 p>.000, there was no problem in validity, and 79.84% of total explanatory power satisfies the conditions of multiple regression analysis [Table 2]

3.2 Research theory

Conservative accounting in enterprises has established H1 and research theory on the basis of preceding studies that are affected by financial information.

(H1) Effectiveness, stability, growth potential, and activity, which are measures of profitable accounting information, will have a positive (+) effect on corporate will.

Research hypothesis H2 was established with H2 based on previous studies in which corporate conservative accounting reflects profits and profits late.

(H2) Measured effect of profitable accounting information Phosphorus will give positive (+) profit to the profit of the company according to the conservatism of the company.

The research hypothesis H3 was established with H3 based on previous studies in which corporate conservatism responded more sensitively to cost rather than rotational power.

(H3) Activity, a measurement variable for accounting information, will affect the negative (-) of an entity's profit benefit in accordance with its conservatism.

Research hypothesis H4 was set up with H4 based on previous studies that corporate conservatism was immediately reflected only in costs and profits.

(H4) Stability, which is a measure of accounting information, will have a negative (-) effect on corporate profits and profits according to corporate conservatism.

The research hypothesis H5 was established as H5 based on previous studies that the conservatism of a company affects the capital structure of a company due to information asymmetry between stakeholders, which is a future growth power.

(H5) Growth, which is a measurement variable of accounting information, will have a negative (-) effect on corporate profits and profits according to corporate conservatism.

[Table 3]Model Summary [b]

Model-0	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std Error of the Estimate-0	Change Statistics-0					Durbin Watson-0
					R Square Change	F Change	df1-0	df2-0	Sig F Change	
1	.533[a]	.284	.279	.69981	.284	53.233	4	536	.000	1.955

[Table 4]Coefficients [a]

Model-0		Unstandardized Coefficients-0		Standardized Coefficients-0	t	Sig.	(95%) Confidence Interval for B-0		Collinearity Statistics-0	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Lower Bound-0	Upper Bound-0	Tolerance-0	VIF-0
1	(Constant)	.000	.030		-.010	.992	-.059	.059		
	Pro	.394	.035	.457	11.251	.000	.325	.463	.809	1.236
	Aro	.075	.037	.077	2.010	.045	.002	.147	.920	1.087
	Sro	-.242	.038	-.237	-6.415	.000	-.316	-.168	.981	1.019
	Gro	-.108	.043	-.098	-2.497	.013	-.193	-.023	.866	1.154

Looking at the results of Table 3, Table 4 found that there was no problem with multicollinearity, profitability (t 11.251.P .000), stability (t -6.415.p. .000), and growth potential (t -2.497.P. .013) and activity (t -2.010. P .045) were also statistically significant, and the study hypothesis H1 was accepted.

[Table 5]Model Summary [d]

Model-0	R	RSquare	Adjusted R Square	Std Error of the Estimate-0	Change Statistics-0					Durbin Watson-0
					R Square Change	F Change	df1-0	df2-0	Sig- F Change	
1	.468[a]	.219	.218	.72922	.219	151.817	1	541	.000	
2	.479[b]	.229	.227	.72507	.010	7.223	1	540	.007	
3	.498[c]	.248	.243	.71711	.018	13.054	1	539	.000	1.984

[Table 6]Coefficients [a]

Mode-0		Unstandardized Coefficients-0		Standardized Coefficients-0	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics-0	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Tolerance-0	VIF-0
1	(Constant)	4.312E-16	.031		.000	1.000		
	Pro	.404	.033	.468	12.321	.000	1.000	1.000
2	(Constant)	3.639E-16	.031		.000	1.000		
	Pro	.391	.033	.454	11.889	.000	.980	1.020
	Cro	.105	.039	.103	2.688	.007	.980	1.020
3	(Constant)	-.017	.031		-.533	.594		
	Pro	.379	.033	.440	11.603	.000	.970	1.030
	Cro	.114	.039	.112	2.959	.003	.975	1.025
	MPro	.153	.042	.136	3.613	.000	.987	1.013

Looking at the results of Table 5. Table 6 found that the research hypothesis H2 that profitability among the measuring variables of accounting information is recognized lately in reflecting financial accounting due to corporate conservatism, which is a controlling variable.

[Table 7]Coefficients [a]

Model-0		Unstandardized Coefficients-0 B	Unstandardized Coefficients-0 Std. Error	Standardized Coefficients-0 Beta-0	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics-0 Tolerance-0	Collinearity Statistics-0 VIF-0
1	(Constant)	4.782E-16	.035		.000	1.000		
	Aro	.170	.040	.179	4.221	.000	1.000	1.000
2	(Constant)	3.425E-16	.034		.000	1.000		
	Aro	.239	.041	.251	5.811	.000	.911	1.098
	Cro	.247	.044	.241	5.597	.000	.911	1.098
3	(Constant)	-.009	.035		-.260	.795		
	Aro	.260	.045	.273	5.827	.000	.774	1.292
	Cro	.253	.044	.248	5.708	.000	.896	1.116
	MAro	-.043	.036	-.054	-1.207	.228	.850	1.177

Looking at the results of Table 7 found that among the measuring variables of accounting information, the research hypothesis H3 was accepted that the conservatism of firms, which is a controlling variable, was not affected by profit-benefit.

[Table 8]Coefficients [a]

Model-0		Unstandardized Coefficients-0 B	Unstandardized Coefficients-0 Std. Error	Standardized Coefficients-0 Beta-0	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistic-0 Tolerance-0	Collinearity Statistic-0 VIF-0
1	(Constant)	-.001	.034		-.038	.969		
	Sro	-.284	.042	-.278	-6.716	.000	1.000	1.000
2	(Constant)	-.001	.034		-.041	.967		
	Sro	-.261	.043	-.255	-6.074	.000	.961	1.040
	Cro	.120	.043	.117	2.799	.005	.961	1.040
3	(Constant)	.001	.034		.026	.980		
	Sro	-.261	.043	-.254	-6.062	.000	.961	1.041
	Cro	.119	.043	.117	2.782	.006	.960	1.042
	MSro	.018	.050	.015	.355	.723	.998	1.002

Looking at the results of Table 8, it was found that among the measuring variables of accounting information, research hypothesis H4 was accepted that the stability of the controlling variable, corporate conservatism, was not affected by the profit-benefit.

[Table 9]Coefficients [a]

Model-0		Unstandardized Coefficients-0 B	Unstandardized Coefficients-0 Std. Error	Standardized Coefficients-0 Beta-0	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics-0 Tolerance-0	Collinearity Statistics-0 VIF-0
1	(Constant)	.002	.035		.043	.965		
	Gro	.088	.047	.080	1.872	.062	1.000	1.000

2	(Constant)	.002	.035		.062	.950		
	Gro	.087	.047	.079	1.872	.062	1.000	1.000
	Cro	.176	.043	.172	4.067	.000	1.000	1.000
3	(Constant)	.002	.035		.062	.951		
	Gro	.087	.047	.079	1.857	.064	.991	1.009
	Cro	.176	.043	.172	4.063	.000	1.000	1.000
	MGro	.003	.059	.002	.056	.956	.991	1.009

Looking at the results of Table 9 found that among the measuring variables of accounting information, research hypothesis H5 was accepted that firm's conservatism, which is a controlling variable for growth, was not affected by profit-benefit.

[Table 10]Coefficients [a]

		Unstandardized Coefficients-0		Standardized Coefficients-0	t	Sig.	(95%)Confidence Interval for B		Collinearity Statistics-0	
Model-0		B	Std. Error	Beta-0			Lower Bound-0	Upper Bound-0	Tolerance-0	VIF-0
1	(Constant)	.000	.030		-.010	.992	-.059	.059		
	Pro	.394	.035	.457	11.251	.000	.325	.463	.809	1.236
	Aro	.075	.037	.077	2.010	.045	.002	.147	.920	1.087
	Sro	-.242	.038	-.237	-6.415	.000	-.316	-.168	.981	1.019
	Gro	-.108	.043	-.098	-2.497	.013	-.193	-.023	.866	1.154
2	(Constant)	.000	.030		-.006	.995	-.059	.059		
	Pro	.375	.036	.435	10.479	.000	.304	.445	.769	1.300
	Aro	.106	.039	.109	2.714	.007	.029	.183	.820	1.219
	Sro	-.227	.038	-.222	-5.951	.000	-.302	-.152	.954	1.048
	Gro	-.105	.043	-.095	-2.431	.015	-.189	-.020	.866	1.155
	Cro	.100	.041	.097	2.450	.015	.020	.179	.841	1.190
3	(Constant)	-.023	.031		-.722	.471	-.084	.039		
	Pro	.354	.036	.411	9.888	.000	.284	.425	.747	1.340
	Aro	.126	.042	.130	3.025	.003	.044	.208	.702	1.425
	Sro	-.226	.038	-.221	-5.994	.000	-.300	-.152	.952	1.051
	Gro	-.094	.043	-.086	-2.205	.028	-.178	-.010	.854	1.170
	Cro	.117	.041	.114	2.851	.005	.036	.197	.806	1.240
	MPro	.189	.045	.167	4.183	.000	.100	.277	.809	1.236
	MAro	-.040	.034	-.048	-1.175	.241	-.108	.027	.788	1.269
	MSro	.052	.045	.042	1.140	.255	-.037	.141	.934	1.071
	MGro	-.071	.053	-.051	-1.324	.186	-.176	.034	.882	1.134

Table 10 results areProfitability, stability, growth, activity, which are measures of accounting information, were conducted to verify the adjustment variables in the effects of the entity's profit-benefit. Step 1 validated the effect on profit benefit as an independent variable, which is a measure of accounting information, step 2 used the entity's conservatism, which is an adjustment variable, and step 3 used the interaction variable between the independent variable and the modifier. Therefore, it was found that corporate remuneration reliably affects the financial structure of a company for costs and losses rather

than overconfidence of managers, and it affects the economic value of a company by reflecting the profitability and profits in the financial accounting late. It also showed that activity, stability, growth do not have a significant impact on corporate remuneration due to future growth, capital structure, and corporate financial turnover.

2. Result discussions

[Table11]Result of research

	Hypothesis	**Result**
H	A Study on the Benefit of Corporate Accounting Information accordance with Corporate Conservatism	
H1	The entity`s accounting information is affected by the by the amount of profit-benefit(+)	**Accept**
H2	Profitability is corporate conservatism (+)Therefore, I get positive (+) for profit-benefit	**Accept**
H3	Activity is corporate conservatism Therefore, it receives negative (-) in profit-benefit	**Accept**
H4	Stability is corporate conservatism Therefore, it receives negative (-) in profit-benefit	**Accept**
H5	Growth is a corporate conservatism. Therefore, it receives negative (-) in profit-benefit	**Accept**



Figure2. Research Model

3. Conclusions

The measured variables such as profitability, activity, stability, and growth were found to have a positive (+) effect on profit benefit. In addition, it was found that corporate conservatism had a positive (+) effect on profitability. the research hypothesis that costs and losses are immediately reflected, but profits and profits are reflected late in preparation for future uncertainty, was proven by the measurement of corporate conservative accounting information. In addition, the results of the profit benefit analysis showed that the appropriate line of dividends between the company's excessive in-house reserves and shareholders and investors was proven as a measurement variable. In this study, we also looked at how agency costs between enterprises and managers and information asymmetry between enterprises and investors affect benefits from corporate conservatism. In the future, discussions are needed to compare the dividend policy profit benefit to corporate conservatism by adding corporate accounting information

and high value-added productivity

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