



## SUNNI-SHIA CONFLICT IN KURRAM, PAKISTAN: GENESIS, FACTORS AND REMEDIES

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
**ABSTRACT:** Kurram, tribal district, formerly known as Kurram Agency, located in the northwest of Pakistan and also bordering on three sides with Afghanistan, has a long history of sectarian animosities. It is blazed in sectarian conflicts almost after every five to ten years. The chronological order of the sectarian conflicts taken place in Kurram are 1961, 1971, 1987, 1996, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011. The spate of sectarian violence in Kurram has many local, national and international factors. The local factors comprise trust deficit, chanting objectionable slogans in processions, extremist clergy, fanaticism of the youth, educational vulnerability, the infiltration from Orakzai, Khyber and North Waziristan and availability of the weapons. National factors include Zia's Islamization, extremist organizations, negligence of the government and the Political Administration. International factors encompass the influx of Afghan refugees, Talibanization, Islamic Revolution in Iran and the external patronage. The analysis has been made in the light of primary data collected through questionnaire from 300 respondents on basis of purposive sampling. The present study is an attempt to highlight the genesis, factors and remedies of the sectarian violence in Kurram in a multi-dimensional way.

**KEYWORDS:** Kurram, Sunni-Shia Conflict, Sectarian violence, factors of Sunni-Shia Conflict, extremism, militancy, sectarian conflict, remedies of Sunni-Shia Conflict.

### I. INTRODUCTION

Prior to 2018, Kurram has been remained as Agency since its creation in 1892. Under 31<sup>st</sup> Amendment in the Constitution of Pakistan, the whole tribal belt has been merged with the settled areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Geographically, it is sharing border on three sides with Afghanistan in the north-west. It is also sharing its border with Khyber, Orakzai and Hangu in the north-east and North Waziristan in the south. Kurram assumes its name due to the Kurram River that passes through it.<sup>1</sup>


Kurram has an area of 3380 sq.km with a population of 619553 according to 2017 census.<sup>2</sup> Administratively, Kurram is divided into three sub-divisions Upper, Central and Lower Kurram. The upper Kurram is the most populated part with major tribes of Turis and Bangash along with some other small tribes of Mangals, Muqbals and Khilji. Turis is the only Pakhtun tribe which is 100% shia while half of Bangash are sunnis and half Shias. There are almost 80% shia in Upper Kurram. Parachinar is the popular place in Upper Kurram. The Central Kurram is populated by the tribes of Para Chamkani, Othizai, Ali Sherzai, Massuzai, Muqbal, Khoni Khel, and Zaikhmat Khel. There are almost 95% sunnis in Central Kurram. The lower Kurram is inhabited by the relatively small number of Turis, Sunni Bangash and Zaimakht tribes. There are almost 80% sunnis in Lower Kurram and popular place is Sadda.<sup>3</sup>



Source: Lynn Carter, *Socio-Economic Profile of Kurram Agency* (Peshawar: US Agency for International Development, 1991), p.1

## II. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

The universe of the study is Kurram consisting of Upper, Central and Lower Kurram. A total of 300 respondents have been taken from Kurram on the basis of purposive sampling in three stages. In stage one 100 respondents were taken from each division i.e. Upper, Central and Lower Kurram. In second stage 50 respondents were taken from each of the Sunnis and Shias factions. In the third stage the 50 respondents were taken from various professional groups. The diagrammatic explanation of the sample is as under.



The graph shows sampling size at first and second stage.

After taking respondents at second stage, they are further distributed at the third stage. In the third stage the 50 respondents are divided on the basis of various professional groups in the following way.

Professional Group	Number of respondents
General Public	17
Teachers	7
Politicians	2
Member of Local Bodies System	7
NGO Personnel	2
shopkeepers	7
Journalists	2
Lawyers	2
Clergy	4
Total	50

**Table: The distribution of the respondents on the basis of Professional affiliation**

#### OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

- To trace the history and origin of sectarian conflicts in Kurram.
- To explore the various local, national and international factors of sectarian violence in Kurram.
- To suggest various remedies for the solution of the sectarian strife in Kurram.

#### RESEARCH QUESTIONS

- What is the origination of sectarian tension in Kurram?
- What are dynamics of sectarian problem in Kurram?
- What is the way forward for the solution of the sectarian animosity in Kurram?

## **GENESIS OF SECTARIAN CONFLICTS IN KURRAM**

Kurram was the place of love, peace and brotherhood. Both Shia and Sunni were living together with harmony and help each other's in time of need. They also participated in each other marriage and funeral. However, the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the Zia's Islamization process introduced sectarian identities in Pakistan including Kurram.<sup>4</sup> The emergence of sectarian violence in Kurram is traced back to 1961.

### **Sectarian Conflict of 1961**

The history of sectarian conflicts in Kurram is traced back to 1961. The Shias, in 1961, were having a Muharram procession in Sadda, when some unidentified people fired at the procession, leaving many people killed and injured. The shias alleged that they were sunnis. Without going into investigation both the sectarian groups engaged in sectarian clash which led to heavy human and capital loss on both sides. Later on, the local *jirga* brought about a ceasefire between the rival sects.<sup>5</sup>

### **Sectarian Conflict of 1971**

The second conflict took place in 1971, when sunnis started the construction of a *Minar* (minaret) in Jamia Masjid Parachinar. The shia community objected the construction of this minaret on the plea that it could be utilized as a bunker against them in sectarian clashes. This controversy generated sectarian tension which later on transformed into the shape of Sunni-shai clashes at large scale leaving many people killed and injured from both sides. A local *jirga* came forward and brought about a ceasefire among the parties. The construction of the minaret did not stop and completed at that time.<sup>6</sup>

### **Sectarian Conflict of 1987**

The sectarian conflict of 1987 took place due to a personal problem which later on transformed into the shape of Sectarian strives. One of a sunni person of Bushera (sunni dominant village) village near Parachinar, was kidnapped on 24<sup>th</sup> July, 1987. The kidnapper (shia) demanded that unless his missing brother is not produced, he would not let him go. The elders of both sects tried to resolve this personal issue, but in vain. The endeavours of the resolution of the issue were continue, when an armed clash engaged between the sunnis and shia of the nearby villages.<sup>7</sup> It is asserted that the clash took place due to the reason that Turis Shia showed an armed resistance to Mujahideen in Upper Kurram from being passing into Afghanistan.<sup>8</sup> As a result, an armed clash took place between Sunnis and Shias. Heavy weapons were employed against each other which led to heavy human and capital loss. Many houses were turned into ashes. The situation was so deteriorated that army was called upon to control the situation. Curfew was imposed for many days. This clash contributed to immense losses for both the sects.<sup>9</sup>

### **Sectarian Conflict of 1996**

The root cause of this conflict was the event that took place in Government High School, Parachinar. It is asserted that some of the students, wrote anti-shia slurs on the black board of the classroom. After resentment from Shia students, the case was reported to headmaster who later on reported the case to Assistant Political Agent, Parachinar. APA initially advised to close the school but later on proposed to keep the school open. On 10<sup>th</sup> September 1996, the annoyed students of both the communities clashed with each other. The headmaster tried to control the situation, when unknown persons fired at the school. It was followed by sectarian strives throughout the Kurram which led to immense human and capital loss on both sides. The *jirga* tried to conclude a peace agreement but failed.<sup>10</sup>

### **Sectarian Conflict of 2007**

The year of 2007 witnessed two large scale sectarian strives. The first strife took place in April and the second in November. On 6<sup>th</sup> April 2007, the shias were celebrating the Eid Milad un Nabi in the form of a procession in Parachinar city. An unidentified gunman fired at the procession leaving many people killed and injured. The situation escalated and both the groups, without going into investigation, engaged in indiscriminate firing on each other, using heavy weapons such as mortars, launchers and machineguns. The clash continued till 12<sup>th</sup> April. The paramilitary forces and army was called upon to control the situation. The curfew was imposed which lasted for many days. The human and capital loss from both sides was an inevitable fact. On 2<sup>nd</sup> May 2007, an agreement was concluded between the parties which broker the ceasefire. However, this truce proved short-lived.<sup>11</sup>

In November 2007 anew fighting starting which was much bloodier than before. On 15<sup>th</sup> November, 2007 when some unknown person fired at sunni shopkeepers in night killing and injuring many persons. The sunnis suspected that they were shias. Similarly, on 16<sup>th</sup> November when people were coming out from their worship places (Imam bargah and mosque) after offering Friday congregation, when an unidentified person threw a hand grenade in Parachinar city, killing and injuring many people.<sup>12</sup> Soon sectarian strives



started in the entire Kurram. Many modern weapons including missiles were used against each other. The clash was continued for five days. On 20<sup>th</sup> November, army and forces intervened and got control over the situation. The curfew was imposed for some days. Meanwhile efforts were started for the resolution of the conflict. A local *jirga* succeeded in brokering the ceasefire between the sectarian groups. As a result, of these two conflicts, the main Thall-Parachinar road remained closed for four years (2007-11). People had to go via Afghanistan for reaching Peshawar. The travel distance from upper Kurram to Afghanistan (passing from Paktia and Jalalabad) and then to Peshawar is about 18 hours while the travel distance from Kurram to Peshawar via Thall-Parachinar road is about 4 hours. Thus, people had to suffer a lot due to the closure of Thall-Parachinar road for four years by covering a long distance between Kurram and Peshawar via Afghanistan. In addition, the closure of Thall-Parachinar road had also led to severe shortage of food, medicines and price hike.<sup>13</sup>

### **Sectarian Conflict of 2008**

The year of 2008 also witnesses two large scale sectarian strifes. The first strife took place in April and the second in October. On 6<sup>th</sup> April 2008, a sectarian faction was observing Eid Milad un Nabi procession, when someone chanted objectionable slogans. As a result, the procession was fired, leaving many people killed and injured. On 7<sup>th</sup> April 2008, the predominantly Shia village, Balishkhel and the sunni dominant place of Sadda engaged in sectarian strifes at large scale which engulfed the whole agency, losing many precious lives on both the sides.<sup>14</sup> Finally, a ceasefire agreement was concluded between the parties in Islamabad on 26<sup>th</sup> September 2008 which is popularly called as 'Islamabad Accord'.<sup>15</sup>

The second sectarian strife in this year took place in October 2008. On 1<sup>st</sup> October, the Shia dominant village (Pewar) was attacked by militants with heavy armaments. In same way, the sunni dominant village (Mangalan) was attacked by fanatics with heavy weaponry. These attacks pushed the whole Kurram into sectarian strifes. Finally, a ceasefire agreement was concluded between the parties in Murree on 16<sup>th</sup> October 2008 which is popularly called as 'Murree Peace Accord'.<sup>16</sup>

### **Sectarian Conflict of 2009**

On 16<sup>th</sup> June 2009, the sectarian groups started fighting over the constructions of bunkers in Khar Kali and Balishkhel. The clash was so responsive that it spread to whole of the Agency. It lasted for 12 days. On 29<sup>th</sup> June, the *jirga* of elders concluded a ceasefire agreement between the parties.<sup>17</sup>

### **Sectarian Conflict of 2010**

On 15<sup>th</sup> September 2010, the Shia dominant village (Kaiwas) was attacked by extremists. The Shias alleged that they were Sunnis of Mangalan village. As a counterattack, the Mangalan was attacked by militants on 18<sup>th</sup> September. The Sunnis alleged that they were Shias. In this attack, the Mangalan village was burnt to ashes and Kaiwas was recaptured by the assailants. In these attacks both the sects had to face heavy losses. On 24<sup>th</sup> September, a ceasefire agreement was concluded between the parties.<sup>18</sup>

### **Sectarian Conflict of 2011**

The Thall-Parachinar road has remained closed since April 2007. In order to go to Peshawar and other parts of the country, the people had to go to Afghanistan to get access to Peshawar. It remained closed for about four years, when, the elders of both the sects decided to open this road in 2011. It was on 4<sup>th</sup> February 2011 when 220 members *Jirga* of both sects entered into a peace truce which was decided to come into effect on 5<sup>th</sup> February.<sup>19</sup>

It was also in October 2011 that sporadic sectarian clashes took place in Pewar (Shia dominant village) and Pewar Tangi (Sunni dominant village). This re-vitalized the already sectarian hatred and rivalry. Eventually, the fighting petered out and another peace agreement was concluded between the parties on 24<sup>th</sup> October 2011 in which Rs. 0.8 million was fixed as a fine for the violators.<sup>20</sup>

### **Local Factors**

Among the local factors are trust deficit, chanting objectionable slogans in processions, extremist clergy, fanaticism of the youth, educational vulnerability, the infiltration from Orakzai, Khyber and North Waziristan and availability of the weapons.

There is massive lack of trust between Sunnis and Shia. All the times, the unidentified persons assault the public process and is immediately followed by sectarian clashes without going into the detail or investigation. This shows that there is enormous gape of trust between these sects. The beneficiary of this lack of trust is the third force i.e. the non-local militants supported by foreign countries.<sup>21</sup> Majority of the

respondents (82%) asserted the sectarian violence in Kurram is due to lack of trust between sunnis and shias.

Sectarian violence in Kurram mostly erupts on the occasions of public procession launched on the eve of Muharram, Eid Miladun Nabi and Nauroz. It is during these procession that many objectionable slogans are chanted which stoked the fire of already sectarian hatred<sup>22</sup>. A large number of the respondents (78%) asserted that the sectarian tension in Kurram is due to the fact that objectionable slurs are raised in public processions.


The extremist clergy in another local factor that ignites the fire of Sunni-Shia Conflict in Kurram. The illiteracy of the people is cashed by the extremist clergy through the narrow interpretation of the tenets of Islam. They try to convince the ignorant innocent masses for the provision of paradise, luxurious life and the benefits after death. Thus, they are easily deceived at the name of religion. The *fatwas* (verdict) of *Kafir* (infidel), issued by clergy also ignite fire of sectarian violence.<sup>23</sup> Most of the respondents (63%) maintained extremist clergy is the root cause of Sunni-Shia Conflict in Kurram.

During sectarian clashes TTP from Orakzai, and North Waziristan while Mangal Bagh's Lashkar-e-Islami and Mahboob's Ansar-ul-Islam from Khyber intervene and fuelled the sectarian violence. The presence of these extremists transformed the small-scale sectarian dispute into a large one leading to devastated human and capital loss.<sup>24</sup> A large number of the respondents (71%) opined that sectarian violence in Kurram is due to infiltration of extremists from Orakzai, Khyber and Waziristan.

Literacy rate in Kurram is low because most of the people belong to poor class. A person with low education can be easily exploited by the militants. The tribes of Bangash and Tori as well as in Parachinar are mostly educated and therefore are either employed or doing their business. As such they cannot be easily exploited for extremism. However, the literacy rate in remote areas of central and lower Kurram is relatively low. The low literacy rates leads to extremism and fanaticism. This situation is further compounded due the problem of unemployment.<sup>25</sup> An extensive number of the respondents (54%) demonstrated that sectarian strives in Kurram are due to low literacy rate.

During Afghan's Jihad (1980s) weapons were provided in this area for training Mujahideen. The availability of weapons and training of Jihadis nourished the militant ideology in tribal area. The tribesmen acquainted with the strategies of warfare and operating different weapons ranging from small weapons to rocket launchers and missiles. During this time, tribesmen purchased many weapons for the protection of their family. After the Afghan's Jihad, the tribesmen diverted their attention towards fighting for the sectarian cause. The trigger-happy nature and easy availability further deteriorate the situation. During sectarian tension, both the sunnis and shia amassed a lot of weapons from the nearby places.<sup>26</sup> The primary data shows that (61%) of the respondents maintained that the easy availability of the weapons has escalated the sectarian violence in Kurram.

Some of the respondents (34%) termed this conflict as the conflict between the tribes rather than sects. The insurgents are present in both the sects. The conflict is mainly started by the miscreants and then it is transformed into sectarian conflict.



**Graph: showing local factors of Sectarian violence in Kurram**

### National Factors


The national factors include Zia's Islamization, extremist organizations, negligence of the government and the Political Administration.

General Zia ul Haq initiated the process of Islamization in Pakistan in 1978. Under this process all the laws were to be treated under Hanafi law. For example Usher and Zakar ordinances were introduced under Hanafi law. Similarly, Hudood ordinance was introduced under Hanafi law. All these laws were greatly resented by shia community in Pakistan because the application of these laws is different under Jafri fiqh. Shias demanded that they should be treated under Jafri fiqh. Although, later on, the issue was resolved and the shias were treated under Jafri fiqh. However, they realized the threat that the state may not usurp their rights under the Sunni domination. It was due to this reason that shias were politicized by forming their own political party, Tehrik-e-Jafaria Pakistan. The Islamization process gave a new momentum to the Sunni-Shia clashes in Pakistan.<sup>27</sup> Most of the respondents (79%) asserted that the Zia's Islamization process escalated sectarian tension in Kurram.

The role of Government is passive in providing lasting solution for sectarian tension in Kurram. It intervenes and provides a brief respite in the form of peace agreements but they are not long lasting. Every time, the army intervenes and curfew is imposed but nothing is done on permanent basis.<sup>28</sup> Most of the people (63%) blamed the government for its inactive role in resolving the issue on permanent basis.

There were small scale sectarian animosities in Kurram. They were of localized nature. Whenever, a sectarian conflict took place the local tribal elders resolved the issue. However, with the emergence of Sunni sectarian organization such as Sipah-e-Sahab Pakistan (SSP), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), and Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM)<sup>29</sup> and Shia such as Kurram Hizbullah and the Mehdi Militia, the sectarian clashes have been exacerbated turning it into a large scale violent nature.<sup>30</sup> Most of the respondents (82%) maintained that militant organizations are responsible for fanning Sunni-Shia Conflict in Kurram.

The role of the political administration in Kurram has also been remained sedentary in resolving the issue on durable basis. The history of sectarian conflicts tells that the political administration intervene when sectarian tension has already been escalated. It is alleged that the political office did not take prior measures to minimize the chances of sectarian clashes. A large number of the respondents (58%) asserted that the political office has a long record of not being showing its serious posture in curbing sectarian violence in Kurram.



**Graph: showing national factors of Sectarian violence in Kurram**

### International Factors

Among the international factors are influx of Afghan refugees, Talibanization, Islamic Revolution in Iran, external patronage and the presence of the US forces in Afghanistan.

During the Afghan Jihad against the Soviet Union (1980s), many Afghan refugees migrated to Pakistan including Kurram.<sup>31</sup> All types of weapons were also flowed into this region. It was during 1980s and 1990s that sectarian clashes continue to happen. Since Afghan refugees were mostly sunnis, therefore, they fought on the side of the Sunnis in Kurram. The Afghan refugees also disturbed the local economy and the demography in Kurram. Afghan refugees are the chief beneficial of the sectarian clashes because on such occasions they plunder various shops.<sup>32</sup> An extensive number of the respondents (81%) opined that Afghan refugees have always been supportive for sectarian strives in Kurram.


Kurram is strategically important because on three sides it is sharing a border with eastern provinces of Afghanistan. It is also the shortest way to Kabul from anywhere in Pakistan. It is also been used as a sanctuary for Majahideen during war against the Soviet Union in 1980s. The involvement of the Taliban from Afghanistan is directly linked with the sectarian conflict in Kurram Agency. Afghan's Taliban and other militant groups always tried to have an influence and hold over the Upper Kurram so that they can easily move the border. In sectarian conflict Afghan's Taliban and other Sunni splinter groups helped the local Sunnis in Upper Kurram so that the strong seizure of Sunnis can be ensured. It is partly due to the Sunni faith and partly due to strategic importance of the Upper Kurram that appeal the Afghan's Taliban to help the local Sunnis. It is alleged that Afghan's Taliban has also been involved in the peace process taken place after Sunni-Shia clashes.<sup>33</sup> Majority of the respondents (78%) asserted that Afghan's Taliban has been involved in sectarian strives more particularly in 2008, 2009 and 2010.

The Islamic Revolution of Iran (1978-79) brought radicalization in shias of Pakistan. The presence of Afghan refugees (Sunni) and the Zia's Islamization process further radicalized the Shais. It led to the emergence of various Shia militant organizations.<sup>34</sup> Maximum number of the respondents (74%) pointed out that Islamic Revolution in Iran also escalated sectarian tension in Kurram.

Both the Sunnis and Shias allegedly receive external patronage and support. It is asserted that local shias receive arms and cash from the Iranian for sectarian clashes. The shai alleged that the Afghan's Taliban and Pakistani Sunni Taliban and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia support the local Sunnis in Kurram for sectarian skirmishes.<sup>35</sup> The primary data (69%) shows that external patronage for both the sects cannot be ignored.



The issue of sectarian violence in Kurram is also associated upto some extent with the presence or non-presence of United States of American in Afghanistan. The Afghan's insurgents are resisting Americans in Afghanistan. Due to the proximity with Afghanistan, Kurram cannot be kept save from these insurgent attacks.<sup>36</sup> It has been observed that sectarian violence in Kurram mostly has taken start from the insurgent attacks. These insurgent attacks usually transform into sectarian strives. About (38%) of the respondents pointed out that peace in Kurram is linked with the presence or non-presence of US forces in Afghanistan.



**Graph: showing international factors of Sectarian violence in Kurram**

### III. REMEDIES/RECOMMENDATIONS

The sectarian violence in Kurram is not a newly phenomenon. It has a long history of sectarian clashes. After discussing all the factors, it is high time to arrive at some of the remedies for the solution of the problem. Keeping in view all of its factors, the following remedies are put forwarded for its solution. The remedies are categorized as; long-term, short-term and local administrative measures.

#### Long -Term Measures

1. Religious tolerance is the first essential principal for bringing inter-faith harmony. Right of expression is the right of every citizen. No one can be deprived from this right. Everyone should be convinced with the help of arguments rather than blind militant ideas. An approach other than argumentative will lead to conflicts and polarization. It is, therefore, imperative to have respect and reverence for others religious ideas and perception. The government should incorporate the right of religious tolerance in the syllabus at all levels so that a tolerant society could be ensured in the long run.
2. The narrow interpretation of the religious tenets should be strongly discourages. The clergy should introduce the element of inclusivism in their Friday's sermons. It should be delivered that all religions are equally respected. It will bring unity and harmony among all sects and religions. For this purpose a non-sectarian council of clergy should be established where all sects should be represented. This platform will not only inculcate religious harmony among people but it can also be used for solving sectarian issues through consultations.
3. The government should eliminate/minimize unemployment and poverty. They are easy tool for upholding extremism and militancy. The government should provide job opportunities to the deprived people. When they are employed, they will be able to lead their live through lawful means. They will not be diverted to illegal activities. The government should launch developmental projects which will carry out not only the welfare activities but also provide jobs to the deprived class.

4. Under the special directives of the government, the print and electronic media should be made responsible to allocate some of the part to religious tolerance, broad interpretation of the religion and inter-faith harmony on daily basis. Teachers, journalists, researchers, academia, politicians and other sections of the society should promote inter-faith harmony. These measures, with the passage of time, will promote a tolerant society in future.

### **Short-Term Measures**

1. The Pak-Afghan border in Kurram should be strongly observed so that the insurgents groups cannot enter into Pakistan. The Pakistani authorities should strongly discuss this issue with Afghanis counterparts to make the border non-porous. The border should be mined with explosive so that to discourage infiltration.
2. The government should ensure the safe return of the Afghan refugees to Afghanistan. The Afghan refugees with passport and visa should be allowed to stay in Pakistan.
3. The government should utilize its intelligence agencies to trace the funding sources (both national or internationally) of the militant organizations. Once the funding sources of the militant organization are determined and eventually ruined their existence would be vulnerable.
4. A permanent ban should be imposed on all militant organization and publication and circulation of sectarian literature. The publishers of such literature should be arrested and put behind the bars.

### **Local Measures**

1. All the non-local extremists (from Orakzai, Khyber and North Waziristan) should be expelled from Kurram. For this purpose a joint Sunni-Shia council and task-force should be formed with the support of the government. This joint body will be highly helpful in identifying and expelling non-local extremist elements from Kurram. In addition, the government should deployed forces on permanent basis which impede the infiltration of extremist from Orakzai, Khyber and North Waziristan.
2. Both the sects should enter into an agreement for identifying and hand over of extremists elements to the government. The government then trial their cases in terrorists courts. This will provide a lessen to the remaining fanatics which have not been arrested so far.
3. A permanent ban should be imposed on delivering provocative speeches by local council of elders (Both sects) in Kurram. The council should unanimously decide that anyone who was found of guilty of being involve in delivering provocative speeches will be expel from Kurram.
4. The local council of elders of both the sects should jointly resort to the awareness programme in Kurram. It should form its bodies in every village. All the bodies at village level should observe its awareness programme on weekly basis in a joint gathering of both the sects. On such occasion the culture of religious tolerance should be highlighted. The local clergy should also play its role in promoting religious tolerance from pulpit. The respect for Ahli Baith and Khulfa e Rashideen should be urged upon by the clergy.
5. Educational and employment opportunities should be provided the people under special quota system for less developed areas. It will not only minimize the sense of deprivation but also help in eradicating extremism and militancy in Kurram.
6. The government should launch joint public-government initiative programme. Under this programme the government should amass all kinds of weapons after taking into confidence the local council of elders. Only small weapons with license should be allowed for family protection. The government should impose a strict ban on public demonstration of the weapons.

## **IV. CONCLUSION**

Kurram, has a long history of sectarian conflicts since its inception in 1961 to 2011. There are many local, national and international causes that have contributed in escalating sectarian violence in Kurram. The local factors are trust deficit, chanting objectionable slogans in processions, extremist clergy, fanaticism of the youth, educational vulnerability, the infiltration from Orakzai, Khyber and North Waziristan and availability of the weapons. The national factors are Zia's Islamization, extremist organizations, negligence of the government and the Political Administration. The international factors are influx of Afghan refugees, Talibanization, Islamic Revolution in Iran, external patronage and the presence of the US forces in Afghanistan. In order to curb the menace of sectarian violence in Kurram, various long-term, short-term and localized measures have been proposed. The long-term measures are promoting religious tolerance, formation of non-sectarian council of clergy, eliminating unemployment and poverty, and role of print and electronic media in promoting inter-faith harmony. The short-term measure include monitoring the Pak-Afghan border, safe return of the Afghan refugees to Afghanistan, ban on external patronage and ban on

sectarian organization and literature. The localized measures are the expulsion of the non-local extremists from Kurram, formation of a local council of elders, provision of education and job opportunities under special quota system and deployment of the forces on Orakzai, Khyber and North Waziristan border. It is hoped that all these measure will reduce the intensity the sectarian violence in Kurram.

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