



Civil- Military Relations and Democratic Consolidation in Pakistan during (2013-16): A Critical Analysis

Dr. Azmat Ali Shah, Assistant Professor Department of Political Science Gomal University DI.Khan, dr.azmatalishah@gu.edu.pk

Dr. Kashif Saleem, Assistant Professor Department of Management Sciences Qurtuba University DI.Khan

Dr. Muhammad Nadeem Iqbal, Auditor the University Of Agriculture Peshawar

Dr. Fazal Ilahi, Assistant Professor Department of Islamic Studies Qurtuba University DI.Khan

Dr. Muhammad Adeel, Assistant Professor Department of Management Sciences Qurtuba University DI.Khan

Saima Razzaq Khan, Lecturer Department of Political Science Gomal University DI.Khan

Abstract- The domestic political, economic and social factors paved the way to the army to plunge into politics. The weak political and constitutional institutions have characterized Pakistan's pseudo democratic political culture. This vacuum has given a chance to military to play its role in national decision making policy especially in security issues. In Pakistan, the dynastic political parties with feudal and mercantile background have always tried to seek the support of military establishment to gain political power. The failure of the civilian governments also invites the military establishment to establish the writ of the government and to control law and order situation. The state of Civil-Military relations in Pakistan continues to be the biggest tentative chunk to consolidate democracy in Pakistan. The civil-military relations in the country have not remained ideal during 2010s which brought further critical challenges for Pakistan's democratic future. This research paper explores the factors which put profound impact on the civil-military relations.

Keywords: Civil-Military relations; Pakistan; Military Dominancy; Poor Governance; Institutional Weaknesses; War on Terror.

I. INTRODUCTION

The geo-strategic status of Pakistan gives strategic importance to it among the regional and international community. Pakistan is bordered by India to the East, Afghanistan to the Northwest and Iran to the West; while China in the Northeast. Pakistan has inherited the most disputed national boundaries with its neighbors who led to military tensions especially with India on Indian Occupied Kashmir and on Durand Line with Afghanistan (Diamantine, 2011.)

Pakistanisa federation comprises four provinces: Punjab, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Sindh and Baluchistan with three territories – Islamabad Capital Territory, Gilgit–Baltistan and Azad Kashmir. The Government of Pakistan exercises the *de facto* jurisdiction over the Frontier Regions and the western parts of the Regions, which are organized into the separate political entities Azad Kashmir and Gilgit–Baltistan (formerly Northern Areas). In 2009, the Gilgit–Baltistan a semi-provincial status was awarded a self-government status through constitutional amendment. The local government system consists of a three-tier system – districts, tehsils, and union councils, with an elected body at each tier. There are 130 districts out of which ten in Azad Kashmir and Seven in Gilgit–Baltistan. The armed forces of Pakistan are the eighth largest in the world in size with about 617,000 personnel on active duty and 513,000 reservists estimated in 2010. Military as an institution is the British legacy Chain of the military is kept under the control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCS) in Joint). The Joint Staff Headquarter (HQ) is composed of the Air HQ, Navy HQ, and Army GHQ in Military District (Pete, 2011). The JCS Committee is one of the dignified position to coordinate among the branches of the armed forces of Pakistan – Army, Air Force and Navy. In addition to this, National Command Authority regulates the Nuclear Policy of the Country (Richard Grummitt, 2009).

The people of the Indo-Subcontinent witnessed several wars. The local people also raised their voices against the British colonial masters. The Muslim of the Indo-Subcontinent lost their power in 1857. Muslims started their struggle to regain their past glory and power from the British Empire. At last, they were succeeded to get an independent state for themselves in 1947. The new born country inherited tremendous social, economic, political, ethnic, linguistic, constitutional, and religious issues. However, the basic theme of this article is the civil-military relationship in Pakistan's political system. This paper sheds light on the brief historical evolution of military regimes in Pakistan.

Evolution of the Civil-Military Relationship

Worth to mention that in addition to other problems during the first decade of independence, Pakistan had also the problem of unequal distribution of military resources. This posed a severe threat to internal and external security of the country. Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, the first Prime of Pakistan, raised the issue with Lord Mount Batten to ensure just distribution of military assets between India and Pakistan (Mahmood, 2003: 39). Liaquat Ali Khan's regime despite political and economic problems tried to bring stability in the country; and he also tried to establish coordination within Muslim League and other political parties. After his assassination, Pakistan fell prey to political turmoil. Khawaja Nazimuddin was compelled to leave the office of Governor General and to assume the power of prime minister. Nazimuddin agreed unwillingly and stepped into Prime Minister's shoes. Governor General could exercise the power of dissolution of the Constituent Assembly. Ghulam Mohammad became Governor-General with the power of dismissing Prime Minister and his cabinet and he used his power in the coming years. Ghulam Mohammad belonged to bureaucracy and was very close to Ayub Khan, the then Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) (Ibid. 45-47).

Civil-Military Relations and Judiciary's Role

Judiciary has an important role in a federation to resolve dispute among federating units; and to uphold rule of law. However, the role of superior judiciary in Pakistan in politics is pessimistic. It is evident from the fact that when Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan, the President of the Constitutional Assembly challenged the dissolution of the Assembly; filed a writ petition in Sindh High Court (SHC) that gave its verdict against the Governor General and restored Assembly. Governor General challenged the Sindh High Court's decision in the Federal Court which did null and void the SHC decision (Ibid. 47). This case paved the way to judiciary to play its role in the political affairs of the country. Later on, the Federal Judiciary legitimized the military coup of October 1958 by relying on Doctrine of Necessity (Ibid. 54).

The Ayub Khan's regime ended with a Martial Law of 1969; and the General Yahya Khan abrogated 1962 Constitution; and he introduced Legal Framework Order (LFO) to run the affairs of the state for an interim period. General Yahya held the first free and fair general elections in the country in 1970s. These elections were followed by the political crisis which ended with the vivisection of Pakistan and establishment of Bangladesh. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto became the Civilian Chief Marshal Administrator (CMLA) on December 20, 1971 and became a popular political leader in West Pakistan and established his own political party Pakistan People Party (PPP) in West Pakistan in 1967. Bhutto introduced new trends in politics; and he popularize politics. Prior to this, politics was dominated by the elites and few political families. Bhutto directly appealed the general masses for political participation. However, Bhutto believed in centralism and wanted to exercise authoritative power (Choudhury, 2006: 294-296).

During Bhutto's regime, the opposition parties launched a country wide agitation under the umbrella of Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) to overthrow him from the government. He also started to target his political opponents. He launched a military operation in Baluchistan. He also resented the industrial class, feudal, bureaucracy, politicians, etc. The country was plunged into a political turmoil which ultimately led to the imposition of Martial Law on July 5, 1977; General Zia Ul Haq took control of the country and became CMLA (Syed, 1992: 151-176).

Zia's sudden death in the air crash on August 17, 1988, re-opened Pakistan's politics to the democratic forces. The then Senate Chairman Ghulam Ishaq Khan became the acting President of Pakistan and General Mirza Aslam Beg was appointed as Chief of the Army Staff (COAS). Once again political actors were ready to decide the country's fate and to restore democracy and to reconstruct political system in Pakistan (Khan, 2009: 389).

Political Chaos and Dismissal of Civilian Governments

In 1988, Benazir Bhutto formed her government which was dismissed by Ghulam Ishaq Khan in 1990; and Nawaz Sharif became Prime Minister which was ended with the dissolution of Assemblies after a long battle between the presidency and Premier office. Benazir Bhutto again became prime minister of the country (Ibid. 397-410).

Pakistan is a diverse society with multi-lingual, multi-ethnic, multi-racial, multi-religious people. Being a business hub, Karachi is standing first in this regard. Multi-cultural thinking gave birth to diversity of interests and these interests led Karachi into crisis. Lawless state of affairs continued in the country's commercial hub. Altaf Hussain, (Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) leader, had always been an influential figure in affecting in political scene of Karachi. Any strike giving calls by Altaf, was never refused and was acted upon whole heartedly by the general populous of Karachi. Being coalition partner

in Sindh ruling, they did not trust one another. Karachi was passing through uncertainty due to tension between the two coalition partners. Killing, kidnapping and snatching had become order of the day. This state of affairs took the lives of about 6000 people. On the other hand, there were additional problems, such as bad governance, highest corruption and male practices of Zardari, defamed Benazir's regime. The then President Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari dismissed Benazir Bhutto's government Ibid. (428-441). and general elections were conducted on 3rd February, 1997. It was the fourth general elections in a decade. In these elections, the Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N) won 151 seats. The PPP emerged on a weak wicket with only 18 seats. Apart from Baluchistan, the Muslim League had majority in all the provinces. Sharif became the PM with a new swing. During, Sharif second term, the opposition and the government benches were on the same page to snatch the powers of dissolution from the president which was used twice against Benazir and once against Sharif. Nawaz government brought 13th Amendment to change the powers of the President entrusted under the 1973 Constitution especially Article 58-2 (b) so as to re-establish the parliamentary character (Ibid. 449-452).

Pervez Musharraf Coup and the Fourth Military Regime

It is a matter of fact that during the political history of Pakistan each and every time when a civilian PM has tried to exercise his constitutional dominance, fell into hot waters. Sharif wished to use his constitutional powers but was thrown out of office. Nawaz Sharif being PM tried to remove General Pervez Musharraf, the then COAS from the office with General Zia Ud Din. This resented the top brass military leadership because COAS was in air while coming back from Sri Lanka. The military tuned against the civilian government and took the reign of the government under a civilian President. The way of removal of COAS was not appropriate but disgracing. Former PM Nawaz Sharif was sent on exile (Ibid. 472).

Like General Zia, General Musharraf also announced to hold election to revive democracy. His King Party i.e. PML-Q won 118 seats out of 342. Religious parties under the umbrella of Mutahida Majlis Amal (MMA) also won enough seats in the National Assembly, specially a good proportion NWFP. PML-Q nominated Zafarullah Khan Jamali as Prime Minister. Later, during the constitutional amendment, the internal political crisis and conflicts between the opposition and the government created quite differences on one hand; and between the President and the PM on the hand resulted in the resignation of Jamali in June 2004. Perhaps, he was the first victim of National Security Council (NSC). Musharraf was in search of likeminded and compatible person for premiership. Shaukat Aziz, a renowned technocrat was called from USA and assumed the office of premiership. In this new government, both the president and PM were key players of decision-making regarding national and international matters. Musharraf and his administration targeted Akbar Bugti in Baluchistan and religious Clerics in the capital in 2006-2007. These two operations stemmed extremism and terrorism within the country. The removal of Chief Justice of Pakistan (CJP) Iftikhar Choudhry in March 2007 by general Musharraf consolidated political parties against General Musharraf which led to lawyers' movement in the country and ended on the removal of General Musharraf and restoration of judiciary. In order to reduce the military role in politics, PPP and PML-N came together to work for a stable democratic process; Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif in May 2006 signed Charter of Democracy (Ibid. 530-541).

NRO: A Political Compromise between Civil and Military Establishments

The political history of Pakistan has witnessed political bargaining; the then General Musharraf introduced National Reconciliation Order (NRO) to give a clean chit to the malpractices of politicians, bureaucrats, and other officials. It was perceived as a "political deal" between Musharraf and Benazir. The political atmosphere finally proved complicated and disturbed for Musharraf because intensive pressure against him was developed for shedding off uniform. On the other hand, Musharraf was desirous for another term as president. On 8th August 2007, he decided to enforce martial law in Pakistan, but, American Secretary Condoleezza Rice and Richard Boucher interfered and played mediatory role in political settlement in the country. They brought Musharraf and BB to sign the NRO. Apart from American secretaries, ISI Chief Lt. Gen Ashfaq Pervez Kayani played an important role in releasing tension between the two. Benazir Bhutto sought to take part in upcoming 2008 elections and to abolish all the pending cases against herself and her husband. The NRO was released few days before the presidential election. Unfortunately, Musharraf obtained political help from PPP. On 6th October 2007, Musharraf was elected as president for another five years, but he had to get the Supreme Court favor to legitimize his power. The status of holding two offices was challenged, and Musharraf did not wait for the decision of the SC and imposed an emergency on 3rd November, 2007; and sixty judges along with CJP Iftikhar Choudhury were removed from offices. Musharraf declared conduction of election on 15th February 2008. Before the election, he appointed General Ashfaq Pervaiz Kayani as COAS on 2nd November 2007 (Walsh, 2007).

Afterward a decade, Benazir returned to the country. She vehemently condemned the Taliban as well as their activities in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), where they had challenged the government's writ. During the election campaign, she was assassinated on December 27, 2008. Benazir's death changed political arena in Pakistan; and the period from 2008 to 2012, a new course of relation between civil regime and armed forces took place. Since 1999, when Nawaz commanded two-third majority in the Parliament, the military rule faced significant differences in foreign policy matters (Rizvi, 2012). A number of elites and political parties were demanding military power for the past decade. This slogan arises when the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) won the majority in 2008 as a result of general elections. The corruption, national resources deficit, economic crisis and bad administration were salient features of Asif Ali Zardari's rule (Shah, 2006).

After the general elections of 2008, the nature of politics and civil military relation was changed. After the death of Benazir Bhutto on December 27, 2007 and party status, a sympathetic vote brought Zardari into power. During the Zardari's regime, the civil-Military relations were not harmonious as they were in the past (Hoffman, 2011). Relatively, Zardari was in hot waters; his regime was in direct tussle with judiciary, the armed forces and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Despite all those issues, the PPP government accomplished its constitutional term (Leiven, 2011).

Zardari's survival, internal and external affairs, generated Pakistan's security issues. The army was engaged in setting up government writ in the border regions of the country as fighters of the US against the fight against terrorism (Huntington, 1971). Various scholars have tried to describe the continued existence of democratic setup in the country. Subsequently a long rule (the Pervez Musharraf government between 1999 and 2008), the new-fangled democratic government got much power from the political parties, general masses as well as the media (Aziz, 2007). It reflects a nationwide agreement and unanimity on the democratic principle. The Supreme Court's Chief Justice repeatedly emphasized its strength to maintain the importance of the Constitution and announced that military rulers will not be accepted in civilian matters. It was a paradigm shift in the approach of judiciary unlike the past practice where 'the judiciary had legitimized the rule of the army in the past'. However, both the army and the ISI were the main factors in the Pakistani government and played an important role in internal and external policies because of weak democracy culture, and selfish political leadership. Zardari established close proximity to trusted friends at home and abroad. He tried to reduce the military's influence in the National Security sphere. Events like Memo Gate, US attack on Salalah check post and Osama bin Laden's death in Abbottabad in a military operation further complicated these relations. Zardari's five years tenure 2008-2012, proved a worst period and the democratic regime lost its reputation; while the military establishment continued to gain appreciation (Ownes, 2011).

In addition, General Raheel became Chief of the Army in November 2013. General Raheel Sharif's three years term witnessed cordial relations between military and elected government, but after he retired, there were some facts released from the press. It was during General Raheel's time when Panama leak was revealed and finally the strongest prime minister in Pakistan's history was removed by the Supreme Court's decision for corruption charges. Some scholars thought that this was an ideal time of civil-military relations but it was not very easy (Wilder, 2010).

On some issues, there were some reservations shown by the military against the civil government. Therefore, in order to show the problem and overall common factors those have always helped in length and width by policy-making and capacity and quantity in the country. The main objective of this research study was to explore, first, the facets of civil-military relations during Nawaz's reign and then investigate these facets empirically.

Theory of Civil - Military Relations




Figure 1: Schematic Diagram of the Theoretical Framework

The important theoretical problem is how to maintain a military that sustains and protects democratic values; and how the classic and still influential theories of Huntington and Janowitz were rooted respectively, in liberal and civic republican theories of democracy; and as a result, neither adequately solved this problem. The paper then uses current research to pose new questions about the relations between military and political elites, the relations of civilians to the military and the state, and the multinational use of force. Based on the review, it concludes that a new theory of civil-military relations—one that accounts for the circumstances mature democracies presently face and tells how militaries can sustain as they protect democratic values cannot be derived from either liberal or civic republican models of democracy, as Huntington and Janowitz tried to do, but might be derived from federalist models.

Statement of the Problem

Most powerful and advanced states have a smooth, sympathetic civil-military relation. Good governance & rule of law cannot be understood without a powerful and developed relationship between political leadership and military establishment. The balance of power between civil and military elites fulfills the demands of a strong state structure. The research paper has investigated the relationship between the civil bureaucracy & military bureaucracy. This research paper is focused upon the characteristics of political system to maintain the balance between civil administration and military establishment.

Research Objectives

- To find out the causes for military support to civilian government during 2013-2016.
- To explore the types of challenges faced by the civilian as well as military during 2013-2016.
- To investigate empirically the factors to give dominant role to military bureaucracy over civilian government in Pakistan.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

To make this study more argumentative and objective, both domestic and foreign literature was consulted so as to understand the selected problem and to address the research questions.

Myrdal (1968) makes a fair analysis of the party led by an army from the early stage of the country's

inception. He discussed the strife for power both a moral as well as ideological bases. A government that tries to create national cohesion and consolidation along with national progress is prone to confront inescapable complications. Pakistan lacks political identity and national allegiance. The inequality based on social and economic growth has created gaps among the public. But if contrived Pakistan can achieve better living standards, diminish inequalities, reduce population ratio and obtain the cooperation and participation of the people, Pakistan can still realize the dream of a great section of its people.

Welch (1976) suggests that, by developing a high degree of specialization in the army, a country may reduce the military's capacity to intervene without affecting its capacity to defend the republic. A large and highly specialized military might find it difficult to pull off a coup simply due to coordination problems. Thus, modern armed forces might be optimized for battlefield performance—each specialist performing his or her role in synchrony with the others—and yet be unable to execute a domestic power grab because all the parts would not know how to coordinate in this novel operation. Welch is correct only if the specialized military does not decide to devote training time to such power grabs. As Welch himself notes, increased functional specialization only increases the complexity of a coup plot. There is nothing inherently limiting about size or role specification that would frustrate a determined military.

Alfred Stepan (1988) provided a useful list of prerogatives, which would have to be annulled if civilians were to make headway. These were areas where the military had a self-proclaimed right to dominate or influence, and ranged from occupying cabinet positions to coordinating the defense sector to dominating intelligence gathering, judiciaries, and the police. But to strip the military of all these rights at once would no doubt be daunting, even threatening, to any new democratic government. Could not some battles over privileges be waged now, while others be deferred to later, and must not it be that way, to avert demand overloads that could trigger military animosity? The sequence by which politicians introduce reforms is critical, and needs to be specified.

Kukreja (1991) says the blemishes of electoral procedure cause a perpetual contraction and the unrepresentativeness of self-perpetuating elite has made the military overtake the rule of the country after a decade, which speaks in volumes the inability of the politicians with their shallow insight and self-centeredness which paved the way for the army to overthrow civilian government.

Pion-Berlin (1994) pointed out the military and human rights in the Southern Cone. Authoritarian regimes in Chile and Uruguay were notorious human rights offenders, which motivated officers in both nations to immunize themselves from prosecution, while prompting families of victims to seek justice. The Uruguayan transition was a negotiated product, with neither the military nor the civilian side having the decisive edge. By contrast, the Chilean transition was imposed by General Augusto Pinochet, granting seemingly insurmountable advantages to his soldiers. Under those circumstances, one would predict stronger human rights initiatives in Uruguay and more tepid responses in Chile. Quite surprisingly, Chilean President Patricio Aylwin took some human rights steps that seemed bold at the time, and were deeply unpopular with the armed forces, caved in to military desires. Neither the nature of authoritarian rule nor the terms of the transition could explain the differences.

Huntington (1995) says that there is a great difference between the civilian and military worlds. He says that these both worlds could coexist without risking and jeopardizing the liberal democracy. He suggests that for maintaining order the civilian authorities needed to frame a way of directing the military without letting it get into the autonomous character and organization or the prerogative of the military world thus keep the politics at bay. Huntington and Janowitz suggest that for better relations to be maintained the civilian power must build up a paramilitary force for tackling any internal disturbance. This paramilitary force must be at the beck and call of the political administration. The army must be kept away from the negative political and social effects of the civilian world.

Wendy Hunter (1997) argues that in pursuit of the goal of surviving in office or getting re-elected politicians choose to contest the armed forces (and potentially antagonize them) over budgetary shares. Their incentive is to re-direct resources away from defense which has no direct electoral payoff to them toward other programs that are politically beneficial. Meanwhile, the military has incentives to respond in a more restrained manner to the politician's initiatives. Civilian and military behaviors are driven by self-interest and the choice of optimizing strategies. Once individual preferences are identified and rank ordered within particular political environments then we find that rather than choice being idiosyncratic it falls into predictable patterns: decision-makers are interchangeable 'adopting the same course of action in the same situation'. If it is true that politicians and soldiers react the same way in the same contexts, the rational choice findings could be generalized. The further advantages of Hunter's approach are that it (1) a priori posits what are the interests and incentives of a civilian or military elite rather than resorting to a post-hoc fitting of theory to data, and (2) is strategic in design, telling us why a politician or a soldier chooses one course of action over another from a feasible set of alternatives.

Cohen (1998) analyses the civil-military relation in Pakistan in 2011. He urges that the role of the army, although, receded, but not minimized and the army remains as the undisputed power having its deep roots in almost every government of the country that got established during the various phases. It depends upon the role of the military as a state institution in a particular country, the subservience of the military to the civilians, government and leadership as directed by the law and constitutional framework. For Loveman (2001) the practices and values of military officers are reproduced over the course of decades and even centuries via the reinforcement of laws, regulations, rituals and myths that have become so embedded that they constitute a political culture of militarism. Akin to some scholarship on institutions, here path dependent forces have the power to transform an actor's preferences, not merely limit his alternatives. And for Aguero (1995) structures yield resources which military and civilian agents can bring to the bargaining table as they jockey for influence.

For Trinkunas (2005) regime transitions can alter the relative cohesion of authoritarians vs. democratizes. This in turn creates opportunity structures (or constraints) which will either widen or narrow the strategic portfolio of civilian leaders.

Rashid (2008) declares Pakistan as a Hobbesian country and says that the root cause of its instability lies in its government's foolishly indiscreet policies in spite of having a powerful army nuclear weapon, geostrategic importance. Pakistan remains unable to maintain a solid political system inside where it could play a vital role in uplifting public lives by meeting their needs. Its weak economy, its illiterate population, unemployed youth and above all a military that supports the Taliban in Afghanistan while consistently fight them in Pakistan.

Niaz (2009) declare that the incompetence of politician eased the way for a military intrusion in the political arena of the country. Whenever Pakistan slides towards bankruptcy theocracy and state future military assistance were sought, but it generally resulted in the military take over. Furthermore, the army's help in natural disaster management provided them to taste the flavor of political power they got accustomed to and their presence or unnecessary intervention became a matter of routine thus the political power and institutional development tumbled down under the indomitable and formidable power of the army.

Haqqani (2010) describes Pakistan, among USA allies as having an ambiguous state of neither as a friend nor foe. Working along with the US with full support, Pak army strengthened its position both outside and inside the country which left a deep impact on the already fragile political setup of the country.

Oldenburg (2010) compares the democratic system of India and Pakistan and points out the factors that made Indian democracy stronger than Pakistan. According to him in many third world countries, the governance system is an arena with various participants, which he calls constitutive authorities, which is a combination of civil bureaucracy, military power publicly elected representatives, religious or clergy and other related parties. The tug of war usually takes place among them. The common belief boasted by the army is there being the only protectors of Pakistan. Narcy's Serra (2010) has proposed a phasing in of military reforms, with early measures invoked during a democratic transitional process aimed at curtailing military intervention in politics, while others are installed during consolidation where politicians assume real leadership on defense. When a decision is made is often as important as what decision is made. Other countries may very well look to the Spanish example for advice, and may ultimately succeed. But how they succeed might differ, and probably will, because the sequencing of reforms is often a function of what is strategically possible at a particular moment, given the balance of forces in a society. Conceptualizing civilian polices within strategic categories is important for understanding how specific moves fit into larger patterns of conduct. Strategies vary by their robustness, with some being more forceful than others.

Croissant *etal.* (2011) highlighted the variation between the relationship between civilian government and military. They cited the example of Latin America, South Korea, Indonesia and Thailand.

Shah (2014) has drawn a vivid description that projects a noticeable involvement of the army in Pakistan politics since its inception. Shah clearly unfolds the permeable complicity between the country's civilian and military spheres. He elucidates that the security challenges overpower the political infrastructure of the country that made the military intervention indispensable.

Siddiq (2017) put forward the concept of Milbus (military capital) as a different military investment in various sectors be it (FF, SF, BF, AWT) has been working for the personal vested interest of senior military officers. The expenses of Milbus have thrown Pakistan into the abyss of uncertainty and its future bleak.

List of Hypotheses:

To test the factors which led to the dominance of military over civilian governments, a quantitative study was conducted and these hypotheses were tested to help understand the imbalance in the civil-military relation in Pakistan.

H01: There is no significant relation between predictor variables (External and Internal Factors) and criterion variable (Dominance of Military over civilian governments).

H02: The predictor variables (External and Internal factors) are not significantly predicting the criterion variable (Dominance of Military over civilian governments).

H03-H07: There is no difference of mean of control variables (gender, status, residence, age and education) and all the research variables (external factors; internal factors and Dominance of military over civilian governments).

III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

In order to achieve the objectives, primary and secondary data was compiled. For primary data cross-sectional and longitudinal data was collected through a survey of political participation in target area. During data collection, preference was given to identify political participation through Cross-sectional data collection. Schedules were designed (in English but questions were asked in local language due low literacy rate) for interviewing political participation to collect different information in selected area. In addition, well-crammed and pre-tested questionnaires were contrived to log the information on all aspects of civil-military relations in Pakistan. During the formal survey respondents were assured complete privacy, interviews were held in places of their choice. There have been assured that the research is not related to any Government agency and information will be utilized for academic purposes only. Most of interviews will be held at home or offices of interviewers. The interview was usually started with an introduction about the background of the respondents, the objectives of the study and the way in which the respondent is chosen. A questionnaire was designed in such a way to cover comprehensively all the relevant information needs for the study.

This study was conducted in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The secondary data of the study was obtained from different sources like books, journals, internet and newspapers and from the students and teachers of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Public Sector Universities. According to the census 2017, population of overall KP is recorded 1,546,094. Population is approximately 35000. The Stratified Samples were used to collect data Yamane sample formula was applied to estimated the sample.

$$s = \frac{N+1}{e}$$

$$N+1(e)$$

$$35000+1$$

$$35000+1(0.05)^2$$

$$35001$$

$$s =$$

$$35001+1(0.0025)$$

$$35001$$

$$s =$$

$$35001(0.0025)$$

$$s = \frac{35001}{87,5025} =$$

$$87,5025$$

$$s = \frac{35001}{87,5025}$$

$$s = 400$$

$$s = 400$$

So recommended population size for this study was 400. Research Respondents were main sources of statistics although newspaper, internet, books and magazine were used as the subsequent resources. SPSS was used for quantitative data analysis. Hypotheses were tested by these following methods.

- Co-relation test
- Regression analysis
- Test of Significance

To get the aims of study, central and subordinate bases of data were compiled. Throughout the official study complete privacy was assured to the respondents. Respondents were guaranteed that this investigation is not associated to any administrative organization and data were to be utilized merely for educational objectives. Time tables were planned to accumulate diverse facts in focused region. The questionnaire was composed in English language however queries were inquired from respondents in native language. A well-managed and tested questionnaire was arranged to record statistics. The written discussion was typically begun with an overview regarding background of respondents, goals of investigation and the tactics in which the respondent was chosen. A questionnaire was designed in such a method to include all relevant information in details which were needed for study. This study was conducted in KPK Pakistan. The secondary data of the study was obtained from different sources like books, journals, internet and newspapers.

H01: *There is no substantial association amid Predictor Variables (**Internal Factors:** Institutional Weaknesses; Poor Governance and Lack of Political Will and **External Factors:** Global Factor; Regional Factors; and US) and Outcome Variable (**Dominance of Military over Civilians**).*

Correlations

		DOM	EXT_GF	EXT_RF	EXT_US	INT_PG	INT_IW	INT_LP	INT_SUM	EXT_SUM
DOM	Pearson Correlation	1	.816**	.818**	.877**	.815**	.914**	.823**	.886**	.893**
	Significant (2-tailed)		.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
	Number Respondents of	400	400	400	400	400	400	400	400	400
EXT_GF	Pearson Correlation	.816**	1	.876**	.749**	.947**	.768**	.951**	.909**	.933**
	Significant (2-tailed)	.000		.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
	Number Respondents of	400	400	400	400	400	400	400	400	400
EXT_RF	Pearson Correlation	.818**	.876**	1	.776**	.863**	.796**	.880**	.874**	.929**
	Significant (2-tailed)	.000	.000		.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
	Number Respondents of	400	400	400	400	400	400	400	400	400

EXT_US	Pearson Correlation	.877**	.749**	.776**	1	.737**	.937**	.748**	.857**	.894**
	Significant (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000		.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
	Number Respondents of	400	400	400	400	400	400	400	400	400
INT_PG	Pearson Correlation	.815**	.947**	.863**	.737**	1	.758**	.949**	.920**	.910**
	Significant (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000		.000	.000	.000	.000
	Number Respondents of	400	400	400	400	400	400	400	400	400
INT_IW	Pearson Correlation	.914**	.768**	.796**	.937**	.758**	1	.775**	.894**	.894**
	Significant (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000		.000	.000	.000
	Number Respondents of	400	400	400	400	400	400	400	400	400
INT_LP W	Pearson Correlation	.823**	.951**	.880**	.748**	.949**	.775**	1	.930**	.920**
	Significant (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000		.000	.000
	Number Respondents of	400	400	400	400	400	400	400	400	400
INT	Pearson Correlation	.886**	.909**	.874**	.857**	.920**	.894**	.930**	1	.946**
	Significant (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000		.000
	Number Respondents of	400	400	400	400	400	400	400	400	400

EXT	Pearson Correlation	.893**	.933**	.929**	.894**	.910**	.894**	.920**	.946**	1
	Significant (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	
	Number of Respondents	400	400	400	400	400	400	400	400	400

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

The Pearson-*r* correlation moment amid External Factors: Global Factors and Dominance of Military over Civilians is brought into being positive, strong as well as significant i.e. (***r* =**

0.841, p=0.000). It reveals the fact that when External Factor: Global Factors increases it will be resulted into more Dominance of Military over Civilians.

The Pearson-*r* correlation moment between External Factors: Regional Factors and Dominance of Military over Civilians is similarly established positive, strong as well as significant i.e. (***r* = 0.847, p=0.000**). It reflects the fact that when External Factors: Regional Factors increase among the masses; it will be resulted into more Dominance of Military over Civilians.

The Pearson-*r* correlation moment between External Factors: US and Dominance of Military over Civilians is revealed the positive, strong in addition to significant i.e. (***r* = 0.895, p=0.000**). It revealed the fact that when External Factors: US increases, it will be resulted into more Dominance of Military over Civilians.

The Pearson-*r* correlation moment between Internal Factors: Poor Governance and Dominance of Military over Civilians is also found positive, strong as well as significant i.e. (***r* = 0.839, p=0.000**). It demonstrates that when Internal Factors: Poor Governance increases; it will be resulted into more Dominance of Military over Civilians.

The Pearson-*r* correlation moment between Internal Factors: Weak Civilian Institutions and Dominance of Military over Civilians is also found positive, strong as well as significant i.e. (***r* = 0.938, p=0.000**). It established the fact that when Internal Factors: Weak Civilian Institutions increases; it will be resulted into more Dominance of Military over Civilians.

The Pearson-*r* correlation moment between Internal Factors: Low Political Will and Dominance of Military over Civilians is also resulted into the positive, strong in addition to significant i.e. (***r* = 0.853, p=0.000**). It established the fact that when Internal Factors: Low Political Will increases, it will be resulted into more Dominance of Military over Civilians.

The Pearson-*r* correlation moment between Internal Factors (as a whole) and Dominance of Military over Civilians is also resolved that this is positive, strong as well as significant i.e. (***r* = 0.936, p=0.000**). It established the fact that when Internal Factors (as a whole) increases; it will be resulted into more Dominance of Military over Civilians.

The Pearson-*r* correlation moment between External Factors (as a whole) and Dominance of Military over Civilians is also revealed the positive, strong as well as significant i.e. (***r* = 0.919, p=0.000**). It demonstrates that when Internal Factors (as a whole) increases; it will be resulted into more Dominance of Military over Civilians.

Researcher establish an adequate amount of evidence to **Reject** the null hypothesis that there is no substantial relationship between causes (**External Factors: Global Factors; Regional Factors and US and the Internal Factors: Poor Governance; Institutional Weaknesses and Low Political Will of civilian institutions**) in addition the outcome variable (**Dominance of Military over Civilians**).

: **Multiple Regression Analysis**

H02a: The facets of External Factors (**Global Factors; Regional Factors and US**) and the Internal Factors (**Poor Governance; Institutional Weaknesses and Low Political Will of civilian institutions**) do not significantly contributing in the Outcome Variable (**Dominance of Military over Civilians**).

Model Summary^b

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted Square	R	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.935 ^a	.874	.872		.344

a. Predictors: (Constant), INT_LPW, EXT_US, EXT_RF, INT_IW, INT_PG, EXT_GF

b. Dependent Variable: DOM

In the above model summary by including all variables, it got up to 0.874 or 87.4 % or 87% changes in dependent variable, Dominance of Military or civilians.

ANOVA^a

Model		Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	302.313	6	50.385	425.409	.000 ^b
	Residual	43.704	369	.118		
	Total	346.017	375			

a. Dependent Variable:DOM

b. Predictors: (Constant), INT_LPW, EXT_US, EXT_RF, INT_IW, INT_PG,EXT_GF

In the above table of ANOVA, the value of the Significance for research variables is 0.000; the value of F (6, 369) is 425.409.

Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	-.236	.071		-3.315	.001
	EXT_GF	.029	.071	.028	.406	.685
	EXT_RF	.060	.054	.048	1.097	.273
	EXT_US	.117	.063	.100	1.850	.065
	INT_PG	.173	.072	.159	2.395	.017
	INT_IW	.628	.062	.577	10.210	.000
	INT_LPW	.085	.074	.082	1.153	.249

a. Dependent Variable: DOM

The above table of Coefficient reflected that that Internal Factors, such as Institutional Weaknesses of political institutions (.577 or 58 per cent) and Poor Governance by the Political leadership (.159 or 16 per cent) will be resulted in to the higher prospects of Dominance of Military government over civilian setups. Furthermore, External Factors-US can also be considered as a dominant factor in the Dominance of Military over civilian governments in Pakistan.

The researcher established sufficient proof to **REJECT** the null hypothesis

The facets of External Factors (Global Factors; Regional Factors and US) and the Internal Factors (Poor Governance; Institutional Weaknesses and Low Political Will of civilian institutions) do not significantly contributing in the Outcome Variable (Dominance of Military over Civilians).

Hence it is proved, the facets of External Factors (Global Factors; Regional Factors and US) and the Internal Factors (Poor Governance; Institutional Weaknesses and Low Political Will of civilian institutions) do significantly contributing in the Outcome Variable (Dominance of Military

over Civilians).

H02a: The facets of External Factors and the Internal Factors do not significantly contribute in the Outcome Variable (**Dominance of Military over Civilians**).

Model Summary^b

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted Square	R	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.914 ^a	.835	.834		.391

a. Predictors: (Constant), INTERNAL_FACTORS, EXTERNAL_FACTORS

b. Dependent Variable: DOM

In the above model summary by including all variables, it got up to 0.835 or 83.5 % or 84 % changes in dependent variable, Dominance of Military or civilians.

ANOVA^a

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	288.875	2	144.437	942.824	.000^b
	Residual	57.142	373	.153		
	Total	346.017	375			

a. Dependent Variable: DOM

b. Predictors: (Constant), INTERNAL_FACTORS, EXTERNAL_FACTORS

In the above table of ANOVA, Significance value for research variables is 0.000, F (2, 373) = 942.824. The table of Coefficients is given below.

Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	-.586	.081		-7.269	.000
	EXTERNAL_FACTORS	.248	.112	.197	2.217	.027
	INTERNAL_FACTORS	.952	.117	.721	8.129	.000

a. Dependent Variable: DOM

The above table of Coefficient reflected that that Internal Factors and External Factors, both are predicting the Dominance of Military over Civilian governments but the Internal Factors (.721 or 72.1 per cent or 72 per cent) are far superior than External factors (.197 or 19.7 per cent or 20 per cent) will be gave rise to in to the higher prospects of Dominance of Military government over civilian setups.

*The facets of **External Factors** and the **Internal Factors** do not significantly contribute in the Outcome Variable (**Dominance of Military over Civilians**).*

Hence it is proved, the facets of **External** and the **Internal Factors** do significantly contribute in the Outcome Variable (**Dominance of Military over Civilians**).

IV. FINDINGS

The main findings of the numerical data analyzed in the chapter are listed below.

Correlation

Table-1: Results of the Pearson-*r* Correlation Analysis

		EXT- GF	EXT- RF	EXT- US	INT- PG	INT- IW	INT- LPW	EXT	INT
Dominance of Military over Civilian Institutions	<i>r</i>	0.816	0.818	0.877	0.815	0.914	0.823	0.886	0.893
	<i>p</i>	0.000**	0.000**	0.000**	0.000**	0.000**	0.000**	0.000**	0.000**

***p* < 0.01 level (2-tailed).

1. All the Predictors (External Factors-Global Powers; External Factors-Regional Powers; External Factors-US and Internal Factors-Poor Governance; Internal Factors-Institutional Weaknesses of Civilian Institutions and Low Political Will of Civilian Institutions) are significantly associated with the Dominance of Military over Civilian Institutions in Pakistan.

In dependent variable Dominance of Military over Civilian Institutions, Internal Factors- Institutional Weaknesses of Civilian Institutions has greater *r-value* of association (0.914); External factors-US (0.877) is at the second level of association,

Internal Factors-Low Political Will of Civilian Institutions (0.823) is at the third level, External Factors-Regional Factors (0.818) is at the fourth level, External Factors-Global Factors (0.816) is at the fifth level, and Institutional factors-Poor Governance (0.815) is at the sixth level, according to the numerical data acquired as of the sample carefully chosen by the researcher for the subject matter under study from the students as well as teachers of the said Universities of Pakistan.

Summary of Regression Analysis

Table: 2. Results of the Multiple Regression Analysis

Model	External Factor-Global Factors	External Factor-Regional Factors	External Factor-Us	Internal Factors- Poor Governance	Internal Factors- Institutional Weaknesses of Civilian Institutions	Internal Factors- Low Political Will Of Politicians
R ² = 0.874, 87.4 per cent or 87 percent of Change	0.685	0.273	0.065	0.017	0.000	0.249

1. 87 % of change in dominance of military over civilian institutions is predicted by External Factors: Global Factors; Regional factors and the US and the Internal Factors: Poor Governance; Institutional Weaknesses of civilian institutions and Low Political Will of the politicians collectively.

2. Only Internal Factors- Poor Governance (0.017) and the Internal Factors-Institutional Weaknesses of Civilian Institutions (0.000) has significant contribution in the Dominance of Military over civilian institutions, while all other factors are not significantly predicting their role in the dependent variable, according to the results based on a sample carefully chosen by the researcher intended for the problem under study from the students as well as teachers of the Four Public Universities.

Tests of Significance (Group-Mean Differences: Independence Sample t-Test and One-Way Analysis of Variance, ANOVA)

Table: 3. Overall results of Mean Differences

	Status	Age	Education	Gender	Residence
External Factor Global	-0.04	0.007	0.015	0.852	0.105
External Factor Regional	0.066	0.005	0.018	0.471	0.262
External Factor -Us	0.117	0.014	0.047	0.825	0.460
Internal Factor - Poor Governance	0.066	0.032	0.023	0.950	0.120
Internal Factor - Institutional Weaknesses of Civilian Government	0.058	0.009	0.023	0.933	0.387
Internal Factor - Low Political Will of Politicians	0.058	0.003	0.001	0.850	0.070
Dominance of Military Over Civilian Government	0.107	0.062	0.008	0.900	0.140

- The control variable, such as the Gender (male and female) of the respondents has no influence on their opinion on all the research variables.
- In the same way, the control variable, Status (teacher or student) of the respondents also has no influence on their opinion about all the research variables, except External Factor-Global Factors.
- Residences (urban and rural) do not persuade the respondents' view about the part of all the research variables.
- Control variables, Age as well as Education has influence on the respondents' opinion on all research variables.

V. DISCUSSION

The primary resolution of the research Paper was to discover the degree, factors and determinants of Dominance of Military over civilian institutions in Pakistan. The literature review shows that rift between the civil-military relations is increasing due to many factors, especially some of the external and internal factors. The results also go in the approval of this declaration. The researcher utilized structured questionnaire and was dispersed in person amongst the teachers and students randomly; of the said Universities Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan. The quantitative analysis indicates a negative effect of the predictors (External Factors: Global, Regional and the US and the Internal Factors: Poor Governance, Institutional Weaknesses of civilian governments and Low Political Will of the politicians) on the Criterion variable (Dominance of the military over civilian institutions), according to the views collected from the sample of 400 respondents selected for this study through non-probability, convenience sampling technique. There is strong association between the predictors (External Factors: Global, Regional and the US and the Internal Factors: Poor Governance, Institutional Weaknesses of civilian governments and Low Political Will of the politicians) and criterion variable (Dominance of the military over civilian institutions). As a result, the analysis based on the Pearson-r correlation moment provides the strong,

positive as well as significant relation amid independent (External Factors: Global, Regional and the US and the Internal Factors: Poor Governance, Institutional Weaknesses of civilian governments and Low Political Will of the politicians) and dependent variable (Dominance of the military over civilian institutions). The results of Regression analysis show that 87% change in Dominance of military over civilian institutions are due to all the Predictors but most of the change was brought about by the two internal factors: Poor Governance by the Political parties and Institutional Weaknesses of the Civilian governments.

This research paper indicates that the only two of the five demographic variables: age and education have significant mean difference on all of the research variables. It is obvious after going through the collected works alongside with the numerical data collected principally through survey method by means of the data collection instrument, known as questionnaire; it displayed that along with a number of dissimilarities, there was noteworthy association in the midst of all the research variables. It is a matter of fact that the review of the existing literature puts forward an sufficient evidence that the role of Poor governance by the political parties under civilian rule and weak civilian institutions play essential role to promote the dominance of military over civilian institutions and this is the reason people look towards the military establishment to help resolve the crucial issues of the country. Eminent scholars and authors also mentioned these factors of promoting the military dominance in the country.

VI. RESULTS & DISCUSSIONS

Evaluating the sessions of the discussions as well as results, following are the leading conclusions drawn from the dissertation:

Dominance of military in Pakistan is essentially in line for to Poor governance by the civilian governments and weak civilian institutions. It is concluded that (External Factors: Global, Regional and the US and the Internal Factors: Poor Governance, Institutional Weaknesses of civilian governments and Low Political Will of the politicians) has solid association with military dominance over civilian institutions in the country in the first hypothesis and all of the predictor variables (External Factors: Global, Regional and the US and the Internal Factors: Poor Governance, Institutional Weaknesses of civilian governments and Low Political Will of the politicians) are playing noteworthy role in conveying variation in dependent variable of Dominance of military over civilian institutions in Pakistan.

It is to the point to remark here that the dependent variable Military Dominance in Civil-Military Relations is endorsed in addition to established in the contemporary years due to the part of independent variables i.e. External Factors: Global, Regional and the US and the Internal Factors: Poor Governance, Institutional Weaknesses of civilian governments and Low Political Will of the politicians. 87% change in Military Dominance in Civil-Military Relations has been observed due the combine role of Poor Governance of the civilian governments under political parties and their incompetent leadership while the remaining independent variables External Factors: Global, Regional and the US and the Internal Factors: Low Political Will of the politicians has minor contributions. Among the control variables the researcher detected no roles of Gender, Status, and Residence in carrying variation of respondents' opinion on different variables. Age and education groups have momentous mean difference on all research variables. Same narrations have been taken into account in the field survey as well as survey of the review of the literature. The role of Poor Governance under the political parties and their leadership and the weaknesses of the civilian institutions which were not even strengthened and reformed by the civilians in their ruling period of time has significantly predicting the dominance of military over civilian governments in the Civil-Military relations, according to the data collected from the respondents of this particular research study. Following recommendations are listed which will be helpful in balancing the civil- military relations in Pakistan. Civilian governments should implement good governance rules and strategies which will reduce the chances of military dominance in the civil-military relations. Political government should strengthen their weak civilian institutions through constitutional reforms and they should also respect the constitution. The military establishment should not interfere in each and every aspect of politics and should refrain from political parties' internal and external politics in the country. Every institution of the state should abide by their role prescribed by the constitution. The global and regional powers, including the US, should avoid welcoming the military intervention in politics because of their vested interest's military in Pakistan intervene and overthrow the civilian governments time and again and the global and regional players like one window operation in Pakistan. Researchers are recommended to take following external and internal factors for further research on the same topic. The status of Kashmir and other militarized conflict as a factor for dominating military and their role in Pakistan; Lack of meritocracy and corruption as a push factor in creating charm for military and hatred against civilian governments; The role of religious political parties in helping the military dominance in civil-military relations in Pakistan; and Charismatic and capable political party leadership as a pull factor

for reducing the role and likeness of military as a political force in the civil-military relations in Pakistan.

REFERENCES

1. Aguero F. (1995) *Soldiers, Civilians, and Democracy: Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press.
2. Aziz, M. (2007). *Military Control in Pakistan: The Parallel State*. Routledge, London.
3. Choudhury, G. W. (2006). *Constitutional Development in Pakistan*. Lahore: Law inn Publishers.
4. Cohen, S. P. (1998). *The Pakistan Army: With a New Foreword and Epilogue*. Oxford University Press, USA
5. Croissant, A. *et al.* (2011). 'Theorizing civilian control in new democracies: agency, structure, and institutional change', *Zeitschrift fur Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft*, 5(1): 75-98
6. Danopoulos CP. (1988). *The Decline of Military Regimes: The Civilian Influence*. Boulder, CO: Westview.
7. Diamantides, M., & Gearey, A. (Eds.). (2011). *Islam, law and identity*. Routledge.
8. Gardezi, H. N., & Rashid, J. (Eds.). (1983). *Pakistan, the Roots of Dictatorship: the Political Economy of a Praetorian State*. Zed Press
9. Hasan Askari Rizvi. (2004). "Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Overview 1947–2004". Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency. pp.10–12.
10. Hunter, W. (2001). 'Reason, culture, or structure? Assessing civil-military dynamics in Brazil', in D. Pion-Berlin (ed.), *Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: New Analytical Perspectives*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, pp. 36-58.
11. Huntington, S. P. (1957). *The soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*. Harvard University Press.
12. Huntington, S. P. (1971). "The Change to Change: Modernization, Development, and Politics" *Comparative Politics* (3), 283-322.
13. Husain, I. (2009). The role of politics in Pakistan's Economy. *Journal of International Affairs*, 63(1).
14. Jalal, A. (1990). *The state of martial rule: The origins of Pakistan's political economy of defense*. Cambridge University Press.
15. Khan, A. (2012). *Civil military relations: The role of Military in the politics of Pakistan*.
16. Khan, H. (2009). *Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan*. Oxford University Press, USA.
17. Kukreja, V. (1985). *Military intervention in politics: A case study of Pakistan*. NBO Publisher's Distributors.
18. Kukreja, V. (1991). *Civil-Military Relations in South Asia: Pakistan, Bangladesh and India*. Sage publications.
19. Leiven, A. (2011). "*Pakistan: A Hard Country*". London: Allen Lane.
20. Lieven, A. (2012). *Pakistan: A hard country*. Public Affairs.
21. Loveman, B. (2001). 'Historical foundations of civil-military relations in Spanish America', in D. Pion-Berlin (ed.), *Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: New Analytical Perspectives*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, pp. 246-274.
22. Mahmood, Safdar. (2003). *Pakistan: Political Roots & Development (1947-1999)*. Karachi: Oxford University Press.
23. Myrdal, G. (1968). *Asian drama, an inquiry into the poverty of nations*. Oxford University Press, USA.
24. Nawaz, S. (2008). *Crossed swords: Pakistan, its army, and the wars within*. Oxford University Press, USA.
25. Niaz, I. (2009). "The Culture of Power and Governance in Pakistan". Doctoral dissertation, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad.
26. Ownes, M.T. (2011). "*Civil Military relations after 9/11: Renegotiating the Civil-Military Bargain*". New York: Continuum.
27. Pete Haiden (2011). *Pakistan*. Edina, MI, United States: ABDO Publishing Co.
28. Pion-Berlin, D. (1994). 'To prosecute or to pardon? Human rights decisions in the Latin American Southern Cone', *Human Rights Quarterly*, 16(1): 105-130.
29. Rashid, A. (2008). *Descent into chaos: the US and the failure of nation building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia*. Penguin.
30. Rashid, A. (2013). *Pakistan on the brink: The future of America, Pakistan, and Afghanistan*. Penguin.
31. Rashid, T. (2011). *Radicalization of Civil Society: A Case Study of Pakistan*. S. Pattanaik, ed., Pentagon Security International, August 2011.
32. Richard Grummitt *et al.* (2009). *Birds of Pakistan*. A&C Black. pp. 6, 38.

32. Rizvi, H. A. (1998). Civil-military relations in contemporary Pakistan. *Survival*,40(2). Sayeed, K. B. (1959). Collapse of parliamentary democracy in Pakistan. *Middle East Journal*, 13(4). Shafqat, S. (1989). *Political System of Pakistan and Public Policy: Essays in Interpretation*. Progressive Publishers.
33. Rizvi, H.A.(2012).“NationalSecurityCouncil:Adebate on institutions and process fordecision-making on security issues”*PILDAT Discussion Paper*,10.
34. Serra, N. (2010). *The Military Transition: Democratic Reform of the Armed Forces*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
35. Shah, A. (2014). *The Army and Democracy*. Harvard University Press.
36. Shah, A.(2006).“Aiding Authoritarianism: Donors, Dollars, and Dictators” in Charles Kennedy and Cynthia Botteron, *Pakistan 2005*. Karachi: Oxford University Press.
37. Siddiq, A. (2017). *Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan’s military economy*. Penguin Random House India.
38. Stephan, A. (1988). *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
39. Syed, Abul Maali. (1992). *The Twin Era of Pakistan: Democracy and Dictatorship*. New York: Vantage Press.
40. *The Dawn* Islamabad (December 24, 2011). “No validation of military takeover, says chief Justice.”
41. Trinkunas, H. (2005). *Crafting Civilian Control of the Military in Venezuela: A Comparative Perspective*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
42. Welch C, ed. (1976) *Civilian Control of the Military*. New York: State Univ. New York Press.
43. Wilder, A.(2010).“Aid and Stability in Pakistan: Lessons from the 2005 Earthquake Response” *Disasters*, vol. 34, no.S3.